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Abstract. From 10.09.06 to 15.09.06, the Dagstuhl Seminar 06371 From
Security to Dependability was held in the International Conference and
Research Center (IBFI), Schloss Dagstuhl. During the seminar, several
participants presented their current research, and ongoing work and open
problems were discussed. Abstracts of the presentations given during the
seminar as well as abstracts of seminar results and ideas are put together
in this paper. The ﬁrst section describes the seminar topics and goals in
general. Links to extended abstracts or full papers are provided, if avail-
able.
Keywords. Fault-tolerance, safety, distributed computing, language-
based security, cryptography
06371 Executive Summary  From Security to
Dependability
This seminar brought together researchers and practitioners from the diﬀerent
areas of dependability and security, in particular, from fault-tolerance, safety,
distributed computing, language-based security, and cryptography. The aim was
to discuss common problems faced by research in these areas, the diﬀerences in
their respective approaches, and to identify research challenges in this context.
Keywords: Fault-tolerance, safety, distributed computing, language-based se-
curity, cryptography
Joint work of: Cachin, Christian; Freiling, Felix C.; Hoepman, Jaap-Henk
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/851
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Reasoning with MAD Distributed Systems
Lorenzo Alvisi (Univ. of Texas at Austin, USA)
Distributed services spanning multiple administrative domains (MADs) have be-
come increasingly popular. In a MAD distributed service, nodes collaborate to
provide some service that beneﬁts each node, but there is no central author-
ity that controls the nodes' actions. Examples of such services include Internet
routing, wireless mesh routing, ﬁle distribution, archival storage, and cooperative
backup.
Unfortunately, there currently exists no satisfactory way to model MAD ser-
vices. In these systems, the classical dichotomy between correct and faulty nodes
becomes inadequate. Nodes in MAD systems may depart from protocols for two
distinct reasons. First, as in traditional systems, nodes may be broken and arbi-
trarily deviate from a protocol because of component failure, misconﬁguration,
security compromise, or malicious intent. Second, nodes may be selﬁsh and alter
the protocol in order to increase their utility. Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT)
handles the ﬁrst class of deviations well. However, the Byzantine model classi-
ﬁes all deviations as faults and requires a bound on the number of faults in the
system; this bound is not tenable in MAD systems where all nodes may beneﬁt
from selﬁsh behavior and be motivated to deviate from the protocol. Models that
only account for rational behavior handle the second class of selﬁsh deviations,
but may be vulnerable to arbitrary disruptions if even a single node is broken
and deviates from expected rational behavior.
As MAD distributed systems become more commonplace, it becomes in-
creasingly important to develop a solid foundation for constructing this class of
services. The challenge is (at least) threefold:
1. to develop a model for MAD services in which it is possible to prove that
a given MAD service meets its goals, no matter what strategies nodes may
concoct within the scope of the adversary model.
2. to demonstrate that MAD services developed under this model can be prac-
tical.
3. to understand how to simplify the development of MAD services under the
new model.
This talk will describe some initial answers to these challenges.
Keywords: Byzantine faul-tolerance, game theory, peer-to-peer, Nash equilib-
rium, gossip, live content distribution
Designing Modular Services in the Scattered Byzantine
Failure Model
Emmaunuelle Anceaume (CNRS Rennes, F)
In this talk, I present the scattered byzantine failure model. In this model
processes alternate correct and faulty periods.
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Speciﬁcally, during its faulty periods, a process behaves arbitrarily (one can-
not expect anything from it during these periods) whereas during its correct
periods, it behaves according to its speciﬁcation. In that sense, the scattered
Byzantine failure model generalizes the classical Byzantine failure model. We
have characterized two reliable services guaranteeing timeliness properties in
the presence of Byzantine failures, namely the Clock Synchronization and the
∆-Atomic Broadcast. We identify necessary and suﬃcient conditions to ensure
the correctness of both services in the scattered byzantine failure model.
Keywords: Synchronous system, moving byzantine failures
A Holistic Approach to Event-Based Modeling and Testing
of System Vulnerabilities
Fevzi Belli (Universität Paderborn, D)
Man-machine systems have several desirable global system properties such as
user friendliness, reliability, safety, and security. System vulnerability is the lack,
or the exposure to breaches, of any such property, potentially leading to an unde-
sirable situation from the user's point of view. Such undesirable situations could
arise from internal faults, unintended environmental failures or malicious attacks
from the system environment. The undesirable system features, viewed here as
the sum of situations, which are complementary to the desirable ones, must be
taken into account in the system development process from the very beginning
in assuring a stable system behavior and a robust operation. In this respect, this
presentation proposes an event-based approach to modeling, analysis and test-
ing of systems that exhibit various forms of vulnerabilities, in particular, those
encountered in user interface design and safety critical systems. The emphasis of
the work is on the holistic treatment of both desirable and undesirable system
features in a similar manner at an identical level of abstraction.
The presentation introduces an elementary test terminology, based on ﬁnite-
state automata theory and Petri nets, and demonstrates the applicability as well
as the eﬀectiveness of the approach using realistic examples drawn from diﬀerent
domains.
Keywords: Modeling, testing, fault tolerance
Veriﬁable Agreement: Limits of Non-Repudiation in
Peer-to-Peer Ad Hoc Groups
Zinaida Benenson (Universität Mannheim, D)
We introduce veriﬁable agreement as a fundamental service for securing peer-to-
peer ad hoc groups, and investigate its solvability.
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Veriﬁability of a protocol result means that the participants can prove that
the protocol reached a particular result to any third party (the veriﬁer) which
was not present in the network at the time of the protocol execution.
Veriﬁable agreement is a joint generalization of agreement and contract sign-
ing problems. Consider a network of n parties, some of which might be faulty
(dishonest) and deviate arbitrarily from their programs. Agreement problems,
such as Byzantine Generals or Interactive Consistency, require all honest parties
to agree on a common output which depends on their initial inputs. Contract
signing can be considered as veriﬁable agreement on a contract text.
We prove the necessary and suﬃcient conditions for solvability of veriﬁable
agreement in both synchronous and asynchronous networks, and give protocols
for all possible cases.
Keywords: Consensus, Byzantine Agreement, contract signing, impossibility
Joint work of: Benenson, Zinaida; Freiling, Felix C.; Pﬁtzmann, Birgit; Rohner,
Christian; Waidner, Michael
See also: Zinaida Benenson, Felix C. Freiling, Birgit Pﬁtzmann, Christian
Rohner, and Michael Waidner. Veriﬁable Agreement: Limits of Non-Repudiation
in Mobile Peer-to-Peer Ad Hoc Networks. In Third European Workshop on Se-
curity and Privacy in Ad hoc and Sensor Networks, 2006. L. Buttyan, V. Gligor,
and D. Westhoﬀ (Eds.): ESAS 2006, LNCS 4357, pp. 165-178, 2006. Springer-
Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006
Authenticated Query Flooding in Sensor Networks
Zinaida Benenson (Universität Mannheim, D)
We propose a novel mechanism for authentication of queries in a sensor network
in case these queries are ﬂooded. In our protocol, the base station appends an
authenticator to every query, such that each sensor can verify with certain prob-
ability that the query is sent by the base station. Implicit cooperation between
sensor nodes during the ﬂooding process ensures that legitimate queries propa-
gate quickly in the network, whereas the propagation of illegitimate queries is
limited to only a small part of the network.
Keywords: Sensor network, authenticated broadcast, ﬂooding, probabilistic
security, symmetric cryptography
Joint work of: Benenson, Zinaida; Freiling, Felix; Hammerschmidt, Ernest;
Lucks, Stefan; Pimenidis, Lexi
See also: Zinaida Benenson, Felix C. Freiling, Ernest Hammerschmidt, Ste-
fan Lucks, Lexi Pimenidis. Authenticated Query Flooding in Sensor Networks.
21st IFIP International Information Security Conference SEC 2006, May 2006,
Karlstad University, Karlstad, Sweden.
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On the Space Requirements of Robust Storage
Implementations
Gregory Chockler (IBM - Haifa, IL)
We study the space complexity of distributed storage algorithms that emulate a
read/write shared memory abstraction over distributed base storage objects. We
focus on the robust storage implementations, i.e., the implementations that tol-
erate contention, asynchrony, the crash failure of the writer, as well as arbitrary
(Byzantine) failures of any number of readers and a threshold of base objects.
Motivated by practical space complexity considerations, we introduce the no-
tion of a constrained storage implementation which only bounds the amount of
data being stored while allowing for potentially unbounded metadata (such as
unbounded timestamps). The only restriction is that the metadata cannot be
used to encode the data.
We prove the impossibility of devising a constrained robust storage algorithm
with even one arbitrary failure of a base object. Our result sheds light on the
inherent limitations on the robustness of practical distributed storage algorithms,
and helps to explain how these limitations are circumvented in the existing
systems. In addition, as a corollary, we get the ﬁrst sharp separation between
safe and regular storage.
Keywords: Robust storage, arbitrary (Byzantine) failures, fault-tolerant mem-
ory emulations, read/write registers
Joint work of: Chockler, Gregory; Guerraoui, Rachid; Keidar, Idit
Combining reliability and privacy in networks in general: a
survey
Yvo Desmedt (Univ. College London, GB)
Current TCP/IP protocols (even including IPSEC) do not have the resilience
to deal with routers taken over by the adversary. Evidently, if the adversary
can control all nodes (routers) in the network, no solution exists. We distinguish
between a point-to-point network and one that allows partial broadcast (such
as ethernet). We distinguish between an adversary that can attack a threshold
number of nodes, or the general case that is described by an adversary structure.
The adversary can be passive (i.e. interested in violating the privacy only) or
Byzantine (i.e. undermine the reliability only), or both. For the case of broadcast,
the issue of protecting networks against moreover jamming is also discussed. The
talk surveys the results achieved and the remaining open problems.
Keywords: Combinatorics, graph theory, reliability, privacy, secret sharing,
multi-party computation
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Application of Dependability Techniques to Security
Problems
Yves Deswarte (LAAS - Toulouse, F)
Some techniques that are commonly used in developing dependable systems have
been successfully applied to cope with security problems:
 intrusion tolerance consists in applying fault tolerance techniques to develop
secure systems using insecure components (e.g., COTS), in insecure envi-
ronments (e.g., the Internet), with untrustworthy users (including possible
malicious privileged users such as operators, administrators and security of-
ﬁcers).
 quantitative evaluation is commonly used to assess certain dependability
characteristics (reliability, availability, safety, maintainability, etc.). This is
much less common in security, but some attempts have been made to assess
quantitatively the capability of a computing system to resist to malicious
attacks.
This talk will present some approaches that can be contemplated to reach
these goals, illustrated by examples of real implementations.
Keywords: Dependability, security, intrusion-tolerance, quantitative security
evaluation
Latency-Eﬃcient Byzantine Atomic Broadcast for WANs
Dan Dobre (TU Darmstadt, D)
With the emerging dependency on Web-Services and their growing exposure to
security threats, service availability has become a major issue in the community.
Replicating at geographically dispersed sites helps avoiding location-dependent
catastrophic failures and attacks such as outages and DoS. To this end, Byzantine
FT replication suited for the internet has been subject to recent research.
Ramasamy and Cachin recently proposed an asynchronous atomic broad-
cast protocol PABC, that is the ﬁrst to have an amortized message complex-
ity of O(n). Although protocol PABC needs only O(n) messages per payload,
compared to previous best O(n2) solutions, it has a higher latency. That is in-
herently due to its centralized (many-to-one and one-to-many) communication
pattern and its speciﬁc recovery mechanism. We show how to reduce the latency
of PABC from 8 to 6 message rounds per payload.
PABC is structured in a parsimonious and a recovery mode. Under normal
conditions, the protocol operates in the parsimonious mode, and under faulty
or unstable conditions, it temporarily switches to the recovery mode.To improve
the latency, we have modiﬁed the recovery part of PABC. Our solution avoids
byzantine agreement on payloads, however it comes at the expense of larger mes-
sages during recovery. Since the algorithm operates mostly in the parsimonious
mode, the penalty incurred has little or no impact on the overall eﬃciency.
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Keywords: Atomic Broadcast, Consensus, Byzantine
Joint work of: Dobre, Dan; Ramasamy, HariGovind; Suri, Neeraj; Cachin,
Christian
Eﬃcient Secure Multiparty Computation with Smartcards
Lucia Draque Penso (Universität Mannheim, D)
We discuss how the use of smartcards enables eﬃcient solutions for secure mul-
tiparty computation and related problems such as voting and fair exchange.
We show how such problems can be reduced to consensus and then present a
novel implementation, for any number of participants, which outperforms exist-
ing ones.
Keywords: Smartcards, security units, secure multiparty computation, voting,
fair exchange, consensus, reduction
Joint work of: Draque Penso, Lucia; Fort, Milan; Freiling, Felix; Benenson,
Zinaida; Kesdogan, Dogan
See also: M. Fort, F. Freiling, L. D. Penso, Z. Benenson, D. Kesdogan, Trusted-
Pals: Secure Multiparty Computation Implemented with Smartcards, ESORICS
2006 (LNCS 4189, pages 34-48). | F. Freiling, M. Herlihy, L. D. Penso, Optimal
Randomized Fair Exchange with Secret Shared Coins, OPODIS 2005 (LNCS
volume to be published). | G. Avoine, F. Freiling, R. Guerraoui, M. Vukolic,
Gracefully Degrading Fair Exchange with Security Modules, EDCC 2005 (LNCS
3463, pages 55-71).
Signatures in Fault-Tolerant Protocols
Klaus Echtle (Universität Duisburg-Essen, D)
Besides their wide use for security purposes digital signatures are also applied in
various fault-tolerant protocols. They allow for an eﬃcient detection of special
malfunctions, in particular wrong replication and wrong forwarding of messages.
This talk presents an example of a typical fault tolerance signature as well
as two special signature types: the relative signature and the UniSig method,
which solve speciﬁc problems of some protocols. Potential counterparts of cryp-
tographically strong signatures for the security ﬁeld are discussed.
Keywords: Fault tolerance, protocol, digital signature, relative signature, UniSig
Full Paper:
http://dc.uni-due.de
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From Dependability to Security
Christof Fetzer (TU Dresden, D)
I will talk about how software encoded processing and automatic patching can
be used to increase the dependability and security of systems.
Keywords: Dependability, security, software encoded processing, automatic
patching
From Security to Dependability - Déjà vu
Dieter Gollmann (TU Hamburg-Harburg, D)
In this talk, I will try to summarize an earlier attempt to provide a quantitative
and probabilistic basis for (operational) security. In the ESPRIT research project
PDCS, a formal framework was developed to model security as a function of
attacker eﬀort, and some experiments were conducted to provide empirical data
on the viability of this research direction. There has been little follow-up work
since, so one might discuss whether there are fundamental limitations to such an
approach, or whether the security landscape has changed suﬃciently to warrant
a new attempt.
Keywords: Security, dependability, quantitative security analysis
Toward Integrating Safety and Security
Maritta Heisel (Universität Duisburg-Essen, D)
We discuss safety and security, as far as requirements, system and software ar-
chitectures, and mechanisms are concerned. We identify similarities and diﬀer-
ences between them. Finally, we point out how safety and security can jointly
be taken into account in a system and software development process, where we
take a pattern-based approach.
Keywords: Safety, security, software engineering
Joint work of: Heisel, Maritta; Hatebur, Denis
New Abstractions for a New World
Matti Hiltunen (AT&T Research - Florham Park, USA)
Security attacks have become a prominent dependability risk in our everyday
lives.
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The abstract fault models (fail-stop, ..., Byzantine) have provided the fault-
tolerance community with a uniform foundation on which to develop solutions
and algorithms for accidental faults. This talk considers security attacks from
the point of view of these fault models. While the Byzantine model is often used
to model a system subject to security attacks, this talk presents and justiﬁes
a stronger fault model, intrusion-stop, as a new foundation for building attack-
tolerant Internet services. We will also outline new abstractions and new roles
for the network (Internet) in providing support for services in this new world.
Malicious Mobile Code - A Look at Network Attacks
Thorsten Holz (Universität Mannheim, D)
In this talk, we present the concept of honeypots. A honeypot is an electronic
decoy, i.e. a network resource deployed to be probed, attacked, and compromised.
This methodology is used in the area of IT security to learn more about attack
patterns and attacker behavior. A honeypot is usually a computer system with
no conventional task in the network. This assumption aids in attack detection:
every interaction with the system is suspicious and could point to a possibly
malicious action.
We focus on malicious mobile code, especially in the form of bots. We intro-
duce a possibility to automatically collect autonomous spreading malware and
present preliminary results. In addition, we present several attack patterns and
attack statistics collected during the last year.
Keywords: Malicious Mobile Code, Honeypots, Intrusion Detection
On the utility of informed replication
Flavio Junqueira (Univ. California - San Diego, USA)
Failures of processes in distributed systems are often not independent in prac-
tice. To capture dependencies of failures, we use a technique called informed
replication, which consists in using attributes of processes to determine failure
patterns. In this talk, we discuss two cases in which the utilization of informed
replication leads to more eﬃcient replication techniques in systems with a large
number of participants. In the ﬁrst case, we discuss quorum selection in systems
formed by multiple sites spread across a wide-area network. By using location
of processes to select quorums, we are able to obtain higher availability. In the
second example, we leverage the diversity of software conﬁgurations in a large
population of hosts. Our goal for such a system is to protect data against large-
scale Internet attacks that exploit a software vulnerability to compromise hosts.
By using informed replication, we are able to reduce signiﬁcantly the storage
overhead of replicated data. We conclude with a discussion on the utilization of
informed replication to secure systems.
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Dependability and Security Benchmarks for Computer
Systems
Karama Kanoun (LAAS - Toulouse, F)
Benchmarking the dependability of a system consists of evaluating dependability
or performance-related measures, experimentally or based on experimentation
and modelling, in order to characterize objectively the system behaviour in the
presence of faults. Such an evaluation should allow non-ambiguous comparison of
alternative solutions. Non-ambiguity, conﬁdence in results and meaningfulness
are ensured by a set of properties a benchmark should satisfy. A benchmark
can be performed with respect to accidental non-malicious faults (design faults,
physical faults or operator non-malicious faults, causing system unavailability for
example) or with respect to malicious attacks (causing denial of services, illegal
access to conﬁdential information or improper modiﬁcation of the system).
The talk will present the basic concepts and components of dependability and
security benchmarking, and examples of concrete benchmark implementations
and execution results.
Keywords: Dependability / security evaluation, benchmarking
See also: K. Kanoun, Y. Crouzet, A. Kalakech, A.-E. Rugina and Ph. Rumeau.
Benchmarking the Dependability of Windows and Linux using PostMark Work-
loads. in Proc. 16th IEEE International Symposium on Software Reliability En-
gineering (ISSRE 2005), pp. 11-20, Chicago, IL, USA, November 8, 2005
Denial of Service Protection with Beaver
Idit Keidar (Technion - Haifa, IL)
We present Beaver, a method and architecture to build dams to protect servers
from Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. Beaver allows eﬃcient ﬁltering of DoS
traﬃc using low-cost, high-performance, readily-available packet ﬁltering mech-
anisms. Beaver improves on previous solutions by not requiring cryptographic
processing of messages, allowing the use of eﬃcient routing (avoiding overlays),
and establishing keys and state as needed. We present two prototype implemen-
tations of Beaver, one as part of IPSec in a Linux kernel, and a second as an
NDIS hook driver on a Windows machine.
Preliminary measurements illustrate that Beaver withstands severe DoS at-
tacks without hampering the client-server communication. Moreover, Beaver is
simple and easy to deploy.
Keywords: Denial of Service
Joint work of: Badishi, Gal; Keidar, Idit; Herzberg, Amir; Romanov, Oleg;
Yachin, Avital
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/849
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Abstracting out Byzantine Behavior
Petr Kouznetsov (MPI für Software Systeme - Saarbrücken, D)
Many distributed systems are designed to tolerate the presence of Byzantine fail-
ures: an individual process may arbitrarily deviate from the algorithm assigned
to it.
Depending on the application requirements, systems enjoy various levels of
fault-tolerance. Systems based on state machine replication are able to mask fail-
ures so that their eﬀect is not visible by the application. In contrast, cooperative
peer-to-peer systems can tolerate bounded deviant behavior to some extent and
therefore do not require masking, as long as each faulty node is exposed even-
tually. Finding an abstract way to reason about the levels of fault-tolerance is
thus of immanent importance.
We discuss how the information of deviant behavior can be abstracted out
in the form of a Byzantine failure detector (BFD). We formally deﬁne a BFD
abstraction, and we discuss two ways of using the abstraction: (1) monitoring
systems in order to retroactively detect Byzantine failures and (2) enforcing
systems in order to boost their level of fault-tolerance. Interestingly, the BFD
formalism allowed us to determine the relative hardness of implementing two
popular abstractions in distributed computing: state machine replication and
weak interactive consistency.
Keywords: Fault-tolerance, Byzantine failures, masking, detection, total order
broadcast, weak interactive consistency
Joint work of: Druschel, Peter; Haeberlen, Andreas; Kouznetsov, Petr
Extended Abstract: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/850
Dependability and security: positioning
Jean-Claude Laprie (LAAS - Toulouse, F)
The presentation is aimed at positioning dependability and security with respect
to each other. This will be performed via their deﬁnitions, their attributes, the
threats that can aﬀect them. Regarding the latter, statistics will be given helping
to appreciate the attention which they should be devoted.
The Failure of Cryptographic Hash Functions - Some
Lessons to Learn
Stefan Lucks (Universität Mannheim, D)
Cryptographic hash functions are an important tool for many crypto-applications,
such as digital signatures. Recently, we have seen a ﬂood of attacks against such
hash functions.
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As it turned out, the hash function's security collapses badly, if an underlying
building-block just slightly fails to meet its security requirement. We discuss new
approaches for the failure-friendly design of such hash functions, providing a
decent amount of security, even if an underlying building-block fails.
Keywords: Cryptography, hash function, provable security
Towards more practical security type systems
Heiko Mantel (RWTH Aachen, D)
After a brief introduction to the research area, I will discuss three directions for
making type systems for informational ﬂow security more practical for analyzing
concurrent programs:
 Characterizations of information ﬂow security are too conservative in the
sense that they are violated by many programs although they are intuitively
secure. As a solution, we proposed the combining calculus, which allows
one to use analysis techniques for multiple characterizations in combination
during the analysis of a program.
(joint work with Henning Sudbrock and Tina Krausser)
 Many common security mechanisms necessarily release some information
about secrets, e.g., password-based authentication or encryption.
This leads to exceptions in information ﬂow policies and gives rise to the
question how such exceptions should be controlled. A recent taxonomy demon-
strates that the existing techniques for controlling declassiﬁcation each fo-
cus on only one aspect of declassiﬁcation (what is declassiﬁed, who controls
the declassiﬁcation, and where or when does the declassiﬁcation occur). We
demonstrate that, though the what? and where? dimensions are orthogonal,
two prominent analysis techniques for these dimensions are not compatible.
We developed a solution that addresses both dimensions.
(joint work with Alexander Reinhard)
 When a program is rejected as possibly insecure by the security type sys-
tem then it is usually left to the programmer to make the program secure.
We present a uniﬁcation-based transformation for making some programs
automatically secure during the type checking. Among other advantage over
previous proposals, the transformation is idempotent, which provides a ba-
sis for multi-pass transformations to enforce security policies with more than
two security levels by a ﬁx-point computation. A similar technique might be
applicable for making programs secure and fault tolerant, given an idempo-
tent transformation for enforcing fault tolerance.
(joint work with Boris Köpf)
Keywords: Security, static analysis, security type systems, information ﬂow
security
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Long-term Security and Graceful Degradation
Jörn Müller-Quade (Universität Karlsruhe, D)
Computational assumptions are either true or false. However, infeasibility as-
sumptions for concrete security parameters may be true now, but can become
false in future. In this talk I will highlight several aspects of long-term security,
i.e. security with respect to adversaries whose computational power increases
over time.
Long-term security is not only important for many applications (e.g. those
involving medical records), but opens up a new area of academic research be-
tween computational security and unconditional security. The talk focuses on
three questions:
1. Secure Function Evaluation: Which functions can securely be computed in
presence of an adversary which becomes unlimited after termination of the
protocol?
2. Universal Composability: under which conditions do long-term secure pro-
tocols compose?
3. Digital Signatures: What level of security can, in the long run, be maintained
by digital signatures?
Especially the last point hints in the direction of graceful degradation, where
not all aspects of security can be guaranteed after the infeasibility assumptions
are broken, but some authenticity properties can still be veriﬁed.
Point 2. is joint work with Dominique Unruh and will appear ath the The-
ory of Cryptography Conference TCC 2007. Point 3. is joint work with Stefan
Röhrich.
Keywords: Long-term Security, Models of Security, Graceful Degradation, Sig-
natures
Parsimonious Service Replication for Tolerating Malicious
Attacks in Asynchronous Environments
HariGovind V. Ramasamy (IBM Research - Zürich, CH)
We present the parsimonious approach for constructing fault-tolerant protocols
and as an example, we describe a parsimonious asynchronous atomic broadcast
protocol that tolerates Byzantine faults of up to t < n/3 parties. It is the ﬁrst
protocol in this model with an amortized expected message complexity of O(n)
per delivered payload. The most eﬃcient previous solutions are the BFT protocol
by Castro and Liskov and the KS protocol by Kursawe and Shoup, both of which
have message complexity O(n2). Like the BFT and KS protocols, our protocol
is optimistic and uses inexpensive mechanisms during periods when no faults
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occur; when network instability or faults are detected, it switches to a more ex-
pensive recovery mode. In contrast to the BFT and KS and protocols, however,
the parsimonious protocol uses more expensive public-key cryptography (in par-
ticular, digital signatures). We discuss the trade-oﬀ between message complexity
and computational complexity. We also describe the experimental evaluation of
our protocol in the context of a representative application implemented in the
CoBFIT framework over LAN and WAN environments.
Keywords: Byzantine faults, atomic broadcast, state machine replication
Joint work of: Ramasamy, HariGovind V.; Cachin, Christian; Agbaria, Adnan;
Seri, Mouna; Sanders, Bill
Full Paper:
http://www.crhc.uiuc.edu/PERFORM/Papers/USAN_papers/05RAM05.pdf
Failures: a basic issue in dependability and security - Their
deﬁnition, modelling & analysis
Brian Randell (University of Newcastle, GB)
There are severe terminological and conceptual confusions in the dependability
& security ﬁeld(s). These come into particular prominence when one takes an
adequately general view of dependability & security problems by avoiding the
(naive) assumptions that systems always have well-established boundaries and
fully-adequate speciﬁcations. This talk seeks to address these confusions by clar-
ifying the concept of failure, and discussing the modelling of failure processes in
complex systems. It takes as one of its starting points the concept of Fault-Error-
Failure chains, and introduces the notion of Structured Occurrence Nets as
a potentially promising means of formalising the deﬁnition and analysis of such
chains.
Keywords: Dependability, security, failure, modelling, analysis, structured oc-
currence nets
Dependability: Relation between its Quality Attributes
from a Software Engineering
Ralf Reussner (Universität Karlsruhe, D)
The short talk will brieﬂy introduce the term "dependability" as a set of qual-
ity attributes, as seen in software engineering. After a cleariﬁcation to the term
"trustworthiness", two kinds of dependencies between quality attributes are elab-
orated and the quality attributes are grouped according to the scientiﬁc process
used in their communites. It concludes with an attempt to relate security to the
other quality attributes.
Keywords: Quality attributes, dependencies, research method of dependability
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Anonymity and Reputation
Luis Rodrigues (University of Lisboa, P)
In ubiquitous networks, the multiple devices carried by an user may unintention-
ally expose information about her habits or preferences. A common approach
to increase privacy is to hide the user real identity under a pseudonym that
is changed frequently. Unfortunately, pseudonyms may interfere with the rep-
utation systems that are often used to assert the reliability of the information
provided by the participants in the network.
This talks addresses the problem of transferring reputation information from
one pseudonym to another pseudonym in an untraceable manner. It proposes a
technique to perform such transfer. Unfortunately, the link between two pseudonyms
may still be established based on the values of reputation transfered. The pur-
pose of the talk is to promote discussion on possible ways to circumvent this
problem.
Keywords: Anonymity, Reputation
Joint work of: Rodrigues, Luis; Miranda, Hugo
See also: A Framework to Provide Anonymity in Reputation Systems. H. Mi-
randa, L. Rodrigues. Proceedings of the 3rd Annual International Conference
on Mobile and Ubiquitous Systems: Networks and Services (MOBIQUITOUS
2006). San Jose, California, July 2006. (Research-in-Progress Paper)
Enhanced Grid Security and Dependability Using Trusted
Virtualization
Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi (Ruhr-Universität Bochum, D)
Grid applications have increasingly sophisticated functional, security, and de-
pendability requirements. Most current techniques aim to protect only the Grid
resource provider from attacks by the Grid user, while leaving the user com-
paratively dependent on the well-behavior of the resource provider. We describe
an ongoing eﬀort to address the trust asymmetry by using a combination of
trusted computing and virtualization technologies. We present the key compo-
nents for a trustworthy Grid architecture and outline a possible implementation.
We propose a scalable oine attestation protocol, which allow selection of hosts
with known and trusted conﬁgurations for job execution and delegation. We also
propose a user-transparent and resource-eﬃcient way of providing dependability
guarantees for Grid jobs, based on secure delegation and migration of the jobs.
By providing multilateral security, i.e., security for both the Grid user and the
Grid provider, we believe that our architecture increases the conﬁdence that can
be placed on the correctness of a Grid computation and on the protection of
user-provided assets.
This talk is based on joint work with Stefan Schulz, HariGovind Ramasamy,
Christian Stueble, Hans Loehr, and Matthias Schunter.
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Why not Use Several Models? - Dependability Properties
under Reﬁnement
Thomas Santen (TU Berlin, D)
Model-based approaches to develop dependable / secure systems often implicitly
suggest that a single model suﬃces to capture and analyze all relevant proper-
ties of a system (with respect to a kind of property such as conﬁdentiality or
reliability). However, it is well-known that many dependability properties are
not preserved under reﬁnement. As a practical implication of this theoretical
result, a correct implementation of the given model does not necessarily satisfy
the desired dependability properties, as the model speciﬁes them.
We describe a framework to investigate the conditions under which conﬁden-
tiality properties are preserved under behavior reﬁnement. We argue that several
models at diﬀerent levels of abstraction are needed to satisfactorily describe ad-
versary capabilities and analyze their consequences on the security of a system.
Conﬁdentiality properties of an abstract model capture the requirements. The
development process than needs to preserve those properties under successively
extended adversary models.
Concluding, we suggest implications of the results for conﬁdentiality on de-
pendability in general.
Secure and Fault-Tolerant Clock Synchronization in Sensor
Networks
Elad Schiller (Chalmers UT - Göteborg, S)
We present our recent results on secure clock synchronization mechanisms for
sensor networks. Our design is useful against an attacker that is trying to disrupt
the cluster management by tampering with the clocks. At any time, the attacker
is in a particular bounded region that may change over time. Within that region,
the attacker may eavesdrop to the local communications, introduce malicious
nodes and compromise the system nodes.
Keywords: Security, Fault-Tolerance, Clock Synchronization, Sensor Networks
Joint work of: Larsson, Andreas; Schiller, Elad; Tsigas, Philippas
Full Paper:
http://www.cs.chalmers.se/∼dcs/
Virtual Leashing: Internet-Based Software Piracy
Protection
Nir Shavit (Tel Aviv University, IL)
Software-splitting is a technique for protecting software from piracy by removing
code fragments from an application and placing them on a remote trusted server.
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The server provides the missing functionality but never the missing code.
As long as the missing functionality is hard to reverse-engineer, the application
cannot run without validating itself to the server.
Current software-splitting techniques scale poorly to the Internet because
interactions with the remote server are synchronous: the application must fre-
quently block waiting for a response from the server. Perceptible delays due to
network latency are unacceptable for many kinds of highlyreactive applications,
such as games or graphics applications.
This paper introduces virtual leashing, the ﬁrst nonblocking software-splitting
technique. Virtual leashing ensures that the application and the server commu-
nicate asynchronously, so the applications performance is independent (within
reason) of large or variable network latencies.
Experiments show that virtual leashing makes only modest demands on com-
munication bandwidth, space, and computation.
Keywords: Anti piracy, distributed security, software security
Joint work of: Shavit, Nir; Herlihy, Maurice; Dvir, Ori
See also: Ori Dvir, Maurice Herlihy and Nir N. Shavit. Virtual Leashing:
Internet-Based Software Piracy Protection. ICDCS '05: Proceedings of the 25th
IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems (ICDCS'05).
IEEE Computer Society, Washington, DC, USA.
Intrusion Tolerance: the Road to Automatic Security?
Paulo Verissimo (University of Lisboa, P)
Intrusion Tolerance has become a reference paradigm for dealing with faults and
intrusions, achieving security (and dependability) in an automatic way, much
along the lines of classical fault tolerance. However, there are issues speciﬁc to
malicious faults (attacks and intrusions) that bring about some problems and
limitations to the paradigm as a basis for designing resilient systems, some of
which quite unexpected. We wish to discuss the theoretical underpinnings of
intrusion tolerance and its limitations in distributed systems, and evaluate some
recent research results that address a few of those limitations.
Full Paper:
http://www.navigators.di.fc.ul.pt/it/index.htm
Secure distributed storage: recent results and open
problems
Marko Vukolic (EPFL - Lausanne, CH)
Even after nearly three decades of intensive research on this popular topic, the
quest for an ultimate secure distributed storage algorithms is not over.
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This talk will go through several crucial dimensions in designing secure dis-
tributed storage algorithms. We will discuss major issues underlying these di-
mensions, as well as techniques used to address these issues. We will summarize
some of the most important results of this research and discuss challenging open
problems.
Keywords: Distributed storage, fault-tolerance, security, arbitrary failures
Joint work of: Chockler, Gregory; Guerraoui, Rachid; Keidar, Idit; Vukolic,
Marko
Synchronous Consensus with Mortal Byzantines
Josef Widder (TU Wien, A)
It is often argued that the Byzantine failure model captures all kinds of reasons
for components to fail, even intentional faults like intrusions. An important ques-
tion is whether this is the only possible model, or whether even more restricted
failure models could be suitable in order to address both reliability and safety
requirements. In order to give some hint of what can be done from the reliability
side, I present some recent work on novel fault models:
I will consider the problem of reaching consensus in synchronous systems
under a fault model whose severity lies between Byzantine and crash faults. For
these mortal Byzantine faults, one assumes that faulty processes take a ﬁnite
number of arbitrary steps before they eventually crash.
I present a consensus algorithm that tolerates a minority of faulty processes;
i.e., more faults can be tolerated compared to classic Byzantine faults. We also
show that the algorithm is optimal regarding the required number of processes.
Keywords: Fault models, Consensus, Fault-tolerence
Joint work of: Widder, Josef; Gridling, Günther; Weiss, Bettina; Blanquart,
Jean-Paul
Towards bounded wait-free PASIS
Jay Wylie (HP - Palo Alto, USA)
The PASIS read/write protocol implements a Byzantine fault-tolerant erasure-
coded atomic register. The prototype PASIS storage system implementation
provides excellent best-case performance. Writes require two round trips and
contention- and failure-free reads require one. Unfortunately, even though writes
and reads are wait-free in PASIS, Byzantine components can induce correct
clients to perform an unbounded amount of work.
In this extended abstract, we enumerate the avenues by which Byzantine
servers and clients can induce correct clients to perform an unbounded amount
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of work in PASIS. We sketch extensions to the PASIS protocol and Lazy Veriﬁca-
tion that bound the amount of work Byzantine components can induce correct
clients to perform. We believe that the extensions provide bounded wait-free
reads and writes. We also believe that an implementation that incorporates
these extensions will preserve the excellent best-case performance of the original
PASIS prototype.
Keywords: Byzantine fault-tolerant, erasure-coded storage, bounded wait-free,
non-skipping timestamps
Joint work of: Abd-El-Malek, Michael; Ganger, Gregory R.; Goodson, Garth
R.; Reiter, Michael K.; Wylie, Jay J.
Extended Abstract: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/848
